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STOCK MARKET REACTION TO ANIMAL DISEASE OUTBREAKS:                    
AN EVENT STUDY IN KOREAN FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE 
 
In Korea, there were five foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreaks between 2000 and 
2010. This study examines the impact of the FMD outbreaks on the stock market value of 
agribusiness firms in Korea using an event study methodology. Eighteen companies in six 
different groups (i.e., pork, poultry, seafood, imported meat, feed and vaccine) are 
analyzed. For each outbreak, single-day abnormal returns and multiple-day cumulative 
abnormal returns are calculated to test for the existence and magnitude of stock price 
reactions. In addition, changes in volatility after the outbreaks are computed to examine 
whether the riskiness of returns change due to the events.  
The results suggest that the FMD outbreaks caused the stock market to react in 
both a negative and positive manner to related firms. The 2000 outbreaks had the most 
distinguishing and consenting results to prior expectations. The 2002 results showed 
relatively stable changes of returns due to appropriate governmental programs. In the 
2010 events, some companies’ stock market reactions were unexpected and did not meet 
our prior expectations as a result of other factors such as market supply and demand 
conditions and another animal disease. 
The results also suggest that the stock market reactions were more gradual than 
instantaneous to the FMD outbreaks. This study observed more meaningful values of 
multi-day cumulative abnormal returns than single-day abnormal returns and understands 
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that these long-lasting impacts are due to the continuous negative news reaching the stock 
market as there were multiple confirmed cases in all outbreaks. When an outbreak 
severely impacted a particular business sector, the accumulations of abnormal returns 
became substantial.  
Many companies had significant results that met prior expectations, but some 
groups did not maintain consistency in their reactions to the events. The pork companies 
realized a negative reaction in the 2000 and the third 2010 events when the outbreak 
presented a negative outlook for the swine and pork businesses. The poultry and seafood 
firms reacted positively when there were no other substantial market threats. The 
imported meat group showed mixed reactions while the vaccine companies had 
consistent positive reactions that met prior expectations. The feed companies reacted 
negatively when the outbreaks substantially damaged the livestock production sites. 
Volatility of the stock prices after the FMD events increased, with more companies 
showing significant results in a longer-lasting outbreak.  
The results imply that managers and shareholders of the affected firms should 
pay more attention on management of their assets when there is an FMD and other 
animal disease outbreaks. It also implies that appropriate governmental interventions help 
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There are many events that threaten the stability of the livestock and meat industry. The 
allied firms (i.e., firms that supply input to and process output from the industry such as 
wholesale and retailing of meat and input suppliers) are also impacted including the stock 
market value of those firms resulting from those events. These events vary from a 
worldwide crisis such as the economic recession in 2008 to a nationwide incident such as 
the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in Taiwan in 1997. These events can be firm-
specific such as product recalls due to foodborne illnesses. For example, the bacteria 
contamination of cantaloupe in Colorado in 2011 significantly impacted the producing 
firm, Jensen Farms. Recently, issues related to human health and food safety have 
become noteworthy events as people pay closer attention to their food and environment. 
Among the noteworthy events include animal disease outbreaks which have generated 
both short- and long-term economic impacts on related agribusiness sectors. 
In the past two decades, many animal diseases have occurred throughout the 
world and caused significant economic impacts on livestock production and operations of 
allied businesses. In 1995, the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in 
the UK was estimated to cost £3.2 billion GBP ($5.0 billion USD) a year (Atkinson, 
1999). Additionally, it had significant impacts on the stock market values of the related 
firms (Henson and Mazzocchi, 2002). After losing the entire beef export market to Japan 
and Korea following the U.S. BSE outbreak in December 2003, firms in the beef industry 
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were significantly impacted in a negative way. Coffey et al. (2005) estimated the losses to 
the U.S. beef industry in 2004 due to the export market restrictions to range from $3.2 
billion to $4.7 billion. Foot-and-mouth disease, one of the most contagious animal 
diseases, has a great potential for causing severe economic losses. In Taiwan, the 1997 
FMD outbreak devastated the swine industry causing billions of dollars in losses, and, 
needless to say, it affected the allied business. The FMD outbreaks in the UK in 2000 and 
2007 also caused significant economic impacts on the livestock and related businesses. 
In Korea, there were five FMD outbreaks between 2000 and 2010, and all of 
those cases triggered considerable economic impacts. In the 2000 event, Korea lost its 
entire meat export market resulting in a substantial structural change in the swine and 
pork industry. The following outbreak in 2002 resulted in more animals being culled 
which ultimately led to reduced meat consumption by consumers and decline in live 
animal and meat prices. The three outbreaks in 2010 were the worst FMD outbreaks in 
Korea. More than 30% of the swine population was culled causing billions of dollars in 
losses to the entire economy. 
There has been extensive research that examined primary and secondary 
economic impacts of animal disease outbreaks. Among governmental agencies and 
institutes, universities, and private firms, most of the research has confirmed that animal 
disease outbreaks were definite events that generated shocks to the livestock and meat 
production and its allied business. Additionally, the research has quantified those impacts 
to livestock and meat industry and broader economy. However, there has been no 
research examining how animal disease outbreaks have impacted the stock market values 







An objective of this study is to determine whether the FMD outbreaks in Korea had any 
impact on daily returns of related firms’ securities. Specifically, the impacts of the daily 
returns will be estimated by taking the difference between actual returns and expected 
returns of event dates. This calculation will also provide information on the magnitude of 
the changes of the daily returns.  
Another objective of this study is to determine the patterns, if any, of the market 
reactions related to both size and length of the outbreaks. There are five sample events for 
which magnitudes and durations are different. Thus, identifying any significant pattern of 
the market reactions is meaningful because that information could be used to help predict 
impacts in a future outbreak.  
This study will also examine the changes in volatility of the daily returns. The 
intent is to observe whether FMD outbreaks have increased the riskiness of returns of the 











This section is included to provide background information about this study. It begins 
with a description of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) illustrating what FMD is and how 
the disease occurred and affected the economy. Because this study is based on the 
livestock industry and stock market in Korea, explanations on overall features of the 
livestock production, its allied businesses and its product consumption will be presented. 
This section will conclude with discussion on the Korean stock market. 
 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
According to the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), FMD is a highly 
contagious viral disease that impacts cloven-hooved animals such as cattle, swine as well 
as sheep and goats. There are seven immunologically distinct types of FMD viruses. The 
typical clinical signs include the occurrence of blisters on the muzzle, tongue, lips, 
mouth, and teats. Other symptoms include fever, depression, hyper-salivation, loss of 
appetite and weight, and drop in milk production. The disease is rarely fatal in adult 
animals, but mortality can be high in young animals. However, the disease can weaken 
and debilitate animals and result in severe production losses (OIE, 2011).  
Foot-and-mouth disease is not transmissible to humans and is not a public 
health risk (OIE, 2012). However, outbreaks of the disease generate significant economic 
 
5 
impacts. Primary losses are a result of culled livestock, reduced consumer demand, and 
trade bans. For example, the continuous outbreaks in Korea in 2010 resulted in culling 
3,318,202 pigs and 150,864 cattle (KREI, 2011). The disease also generated additional 
losses to the broader economy. The 2010 outbreaks in Korea were estimated to cost 0.1% 
of the total gross domestic product (GDP) to the nation’s economy (KREI, 2011). In 
addition, FMD outbreaks impose bans of exported meat products from infectious 
countries in accordance with the OIE’s guidelines. The 2000 FMD outbreak in Korea 
resulted in an export ban on pork to Japan. Korea reacquired an FMD disease-
free status in August 2001, 18 months after the break, but pork exports to Japan had not 
begun before the next outbreak in April 2002 (i.e., 26 months after the 2000 outbreak). 
Foot-and-mouth disease occurs throughout much of the world, while Australia, 
New Zealand, Indonesia, Central and North America, Western Europe, and some 
countries in Latin America are FMD free. Moreover, FMD is endemic in several parts of 
Asia, a large part of Africa and the Middle East. Most notable countries that have 
experienced severe outbreaks in the past include the United Kingdom, Taiwan, China, 
and Korea (OIE, 2011). The United Kingdom reported two recent epidemics in 2001 and 
2007. In 2001, the outbreak resulted in 2,026 cases of the disease in farms throughout the 
British countryside. Over six million sheep and cattle were destroyed in an attempt to 
control and eradicate the disease. This episode was recorded as one of the worst FMD 
outbreaks in the world (Scudamore, 2002). Another disastrous outbreak occurred in 
Taiwan in 1997. By the end of the outbreak, over 3.8 million swine were destroyed at 
a cost of $6.9 billion USD. The Taiwanese swine industry, which had supplied 41% of 
Japan’s pork imports in 1996 was devastated (Huang, 2000). Although Japan reopened its 
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pork market to Taiwan in July 1998, partially allowing for processed products, Taiwan 
has never recovered its strength of export-centered pork industry until recently (KREI, 
2011). 
 
The FMD Outbreaks in Korea: Characteristics and Economic Impacts 
After more than 60 years of maintaining FMD disease-free status, FMD was discovered 
in Korea in 2000. Table 1 summarizes the five Korean FMD outbreaks that occurred 
between 2000 and 2010. The first infection in 2000 was confirmed on March 27
th
 with 
the outbreak being eradicated on April 16
th
, resulting in 15 confirmed cases and 2,216 
culled animals. The majority of culled animals were beef cattle. Although this outbreak 
only lasted 20 days, it caused significant losses to the livestock industry and its allied 
businesses. Shortly after the outbreak was declared over, the Korea Rural Economic 
Institute (KREI) estimated the primary and secondary economic impacts of the outbreak. 
KREI (2000) estimated that the livestock production lost 1,349.3 billion won (1.2 billion 
USD
1
) with more than 99% of loss due to decline in livestock prices. In the allied 
business sector, it was estimated the processing, wholesale, and retailing businesses 
incurred losses of 1,066.3 billion won (0.9 billion USD). In addition to the losses incurred 
domestically, KREI concluded the swine industry in Korea would lose additional 2,876 
billion won (2.5 billion USD) for five years due to the ban on pork exports.     
In 2002, another outbreak occurred in Korea with the first confirmation on May 
3
rd
 and lasted for 51 days. A total of 160,155 animals were culled with 16 confirmed 
                                                 
1 Based on the average exchange rate in 2000, 1,131.03 Korean won/USD. The rate is applied for all 
values in 2000. 
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cases (KREI, 2002). Different from the 2000 outbreak, 99.1% of the culled animals were 
swine. KREI (2002) estimated that the swine-producer surplus decreased by 81.7 billion 
won (65.1 million USD
2
). In addition, KREI conducted a survey to investigate the 
consumer’s reaction to the FMD outbreak. With 500 consumers surveyed in the 
metropolitan area of Seoul during the outbreak, they found that 99.8% of survey 
responders were aware of the outbreak with 53.3% believing that FMD was dangerous to 
human health. Additionally, 49.5% answered that they reduced their meat consumption 
after the outbreak. This explains why and how an FMD outbreak threatens the livestock 
industry and its food market.  
Three outbreaks occurred in 2010. The first outbreak in 2010 began on January 
4
th
 and was eradicated on January 29
th
. This case ended up with six confirmed cases and 
5,956 culled animals. The second outbreak, which was confirmed on April 9
th
 and 
terminated on May 6
th
, resulted in 49,784 culled animals with 11 confirmed cases. The 
final outbreak in 2010 began on November 29
th
 and was over on April 3, 2011. The 
number of animals culled during this outbreak was approximately 3.5 million head, 
which accounted for 33.4% and 4.5% of the total swine and cattle population, 
respectively (NACF, 2011). KREI (2011) estimated that the outbreaks between 2010 and 
2011 reduced 32.0%, 8.4%, and 3.9% in pig, dairy, and beef cattle sales, respectively. In 
addition to the primary loss in the livestock production, KREI (2011) estimated the 
economic impacts of the outbreak on the entire economy and concluded that the losses 
accounted for 0.1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010.  
 
                                                 
2 Based on the average exchange rate in 2002, 1,254.55 Korean won/USD. The rate is applied for all 
values in 2002. 
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The Korean Livestock & Meat Industry 
Production Sector 
The size of the Korean livestock sector has increased over the past three decades. Table 2 
summarizes livestock production in Korea. The number of beef cattle plummeted in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s due to the trade liberalization of the beef market under the 
Uruguay Round Agreement. However, it has gradually recovered reaching 2.9 million 
head in 2010. The number of swine also increased from 6.5 million head in 1995 to 9.9 
million head in 2010. The number of chickens increased drastically from 85.8 million in 
1995 to 149.2 million head in 2010 (NACF, 2011).  
Although the number of livestock has been increasing in the past decade, the 
number of farms has substantially decreased resulting in increasing farm size. This 
pattern is similar to what has been seen in the U.S. livestock production. The number of 
beef cattle, dairy cattle, swine, and chicken per farm increased by 240%, 182%, 854%, 
and 968% from 1995 to 2010, respectively (NACF, 2011).  
The Korean livestock production was 0.3% of the nation’s total GDP in 2009, 
down from 0.6% of GDP in 2005. Sales of total agricultural production in 2010 were 
43,720 billion won (37.8 billion USD
3
), with livestock sales valued at 17,872 billion won 
(15.5 billion USD) (i.e., livestock sales comprised 40.9% of the total agricultural sales). 
One reason for the increase is that the per capita consumption has continuously increased 
as shown in Table 3, and price of livestock products has also climbed as production cost 
increased (NACF, 2011). 
                                                 
3 Based on the average exchange rate in 2010, 1,155.48 Korean won/USD.  
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Slaughtering and Wholesale Sector 
The Korean slaughtering and wholesale sectors have a complex structure. In the beef 
sector, slaughtering and wholesale companies are mostly separated. In 2010, there were 
87 slaughtering facilities. These facilities slaughter livestock by the request of farmers, 
farmers’ unions, or cooperatives, without transition of ownership of the livestock. Many 
of the beef slaughtering firms are small in size and operation. There are 14 beef 
slaughtering companies that also run an auction wholesale market where wholesalers join 
and bid on livestock carcasses. After slaughtering, general wholesalers, chain retailing 
stores, individual food businesses, and butcher shops distribute 35%, 33%, 18%, and 14% 
of the total wholesale quantity, respectively. Overall, there are not any large-scale 
integrated systems or any leading beef packers in Korea, as in the U.S. (NACF, 2011).  
Similar to the U.S., the pork slaughtering and wholesale sectors are more 
integrated when compared to the beef sector. In 2000, 85% of all pork was slaughtered 
and distributed by integrated companies. From the early 1990s, farm-processor 
integration was introduced in this sector, and cooperatives, feed companies, and 
wholesale companies joined in this movement. Some companies are publically traded and 
included in this study. However, the market shares of several leading companies, such as 
Sunjin Holdings and Farmsco, do not exceed 3% of branded pork sales. The poultry 
sector is the most integrated sector, with 91% of all processed chicken handled by 38 
integrators. Among them, the top four companies handle more than 50% of total 






Per capita meat consumption in Korea is small when compared to those of western 
countries. However, it has been steadily increasing since 1995. Table 3 shows per capita 
meat consumption by product. In 2010, per capita consumption of meat, eggs, and milk 
was 41.4 kg (90.4 lbs), 11.8 kg (26.0 lbs), and 62.8 kg (138.5 lbs), respectively. Between 
1995 and 2010, red meat and milk consumption has increased approximately by 30%, 
while chicken consumption has more than doubled. Fish consumption also increased 
from 36.8 kg (81.1 lbs) per capita in 2000 to 49.8 kg (109.8 lbs) per capita in 2009. 
Korean people have been continuously increasing consumption of protein derived from 
animal and seafood sources (NACF, 2011). 
 
Allied Businesses of the Korean Livestock Industry 
The feed industry in Korea is the most crucial allied business in the livestock industry. 
Currently, there are 86 feed companies in Korea. In 2010, the feed industry produced 
17.5 million metric tons of formulated feed mixture, with gross sales around 7.0 trillion 
won (6.1 billion USD) (NACF, 2011). Almost 100 percent of commercial swine and 
poultry operations in Korea use formulated feed mixture that is produced by those feed 
companies. Approximately 50% of commercial beef and dairy cattle operations in Korea 
also rely on formulated feeds. This is important because it is possible that a negative 
event on the livestock production sectors will negatively affect financial performances of 
feed companies and returns for shareholders. Apart from the feed industry, most of the 
allied businesses are generally smaller in size, including vaccination companies.  
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Korean Stock Market 
The Korean stock market is run by the Korea Exchange (KRX), which is the sole 
securities exchange operator in the Republic of Korea. The market has three divisions: 
Stock Market Division, KOSDAQ Market Division and Derivatives Market Division. As 
of June 30, 2011, the Korea Exchange had 1,801 publically traded companies with a 
combined market capitalization of $1.2 trillion (WFE, 2012).  
There are several indices in the Korea Exchange: KOSPI, KOSPI 200, KRS 100, 
and other indices in the Derivatives Market Division. Among them, KOSPI (Korea 
Composite Stock Price Index) is the index in which all common stocks are traded on the 
Stock Market Division. It is the representative stock market index of Korea, such as the 




















The literature review is divided into four sections. The first section describes the 
literature that identifies what business sectors are influenced by animal disease outbreaks. 
The second and third sections examine the literature that has studied event study 
methodology and has applied event study methodology in the agribusiness sectors, 
respectively. The fourth section describes the literature that has examined the economic 
impacts of the FMD outbreaks in Korea. Finally, this chapter concludes with the 
contribution that this research makes to the applied event study methodology in the 
agribusiness sectors. 
 
Specifying Influenced Business Sectors 
There is a rich set of literature investigating the impacts of animal disease outbreaks on 
both the livestock and meat sectors and the broader economy. Pritchett et al. (2005) 
surveyed previous literature in this area which this thesis refers to define the scope of 
study. They confirmed that meat processors such as slaughterers, wholesalers, retailing 
and food service are impacted as a result of animal disease outbreak. In addition, they 
found that the outbreaks also affected allied agribusinesses such as animal feed and 




Mangen and Burrell (2001) investigated the change of consumer preference for 
meat and fish in the Netherlands triggered by bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). 
They concluded that consumers shifted their preference from red meat to poultry and 
seafood responding to the BSE crisis of March 1996 in England. This suggests that 
agribusinesses producing substitute products could experience a positive impact from an 
animal disease outbreak.  
 
Event Study Methodology 
Brown and Warner (1985) reviewed their previous study on event study method with 
monthly returns and simulated the method with daily return data. They specify how 
abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated and how 
the results are tested for significance using parametric tests. They found that the method 
based on the OLS market model is well-specified under a variety of conditions. However, 
they argued that daily return data present difficulties due to autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
MacKinlay (1997) made a significant contribution to the event study literature. In 
addition to reviewing and summarizing different methods of conducting event studies, he 
provided different procedures in conducting an event study. First, he reviewed two 
statistical models and one economic model for measuring normal return: 1) Constant 
Mean Return Model, 2) Market Model, and 3) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Between the two statistical models discussed, the market model represents a potential 
improvement over the constant mean return model, as the market model reduces 
variances of abnormal returns by removing the portion of return that is related to 
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variation in the market’s return. Armitage (1995) also confirmed that the market model is 
most commonly used to generate expected returns, and no better alternative has been 
found despite the weak relationship between beta and actual returns. He also 
demonstrated how abnormal returns (AR) on single days and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) as aggregations of periodical post-event windows are calculated. In 
conclusion, most successful applications of this method have been in the area of 
corporate finance.    
Armitage (1995) outlined widely used methods of estimating abnormal returns 
and testing their significance and reviewed research comparing results produced in 
various empirical contexts. He concluded that the market model performed the best when 
generating expected returns. More specifically, he recommended that 250 trading days or 
one calendar year is appropriate to estimate expected returns using the OLS market 
model. Additionally, he outlined how to identify event windows. Armitage used several 
different event windows when examining market reactions (i.e., five-day event window: 
T = [-5, +5], two-day event window: T = [-2, +2], and one-day event window: T = [-1, 
+1]). Senchack and Starks (1993) noted that event windows generally extend beyond a 
certain event date to account for information leakage.  
Volatility of stock market returns is another critical factor when considering the 
impacts of a certain market shock because it indicates changes in riskiness of the returns. 
Salin and Hooker (2001) tested for changes in volatility after food recall events using the   
standard deviation of the returns. They examined post-event changes in volatility and 
concluded that two of four sample companies showed increased volatility after food 
recall events.   
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Applied Event Study Methodology in Agribusiness Sectors 
Event study methodology has been frequently used in the area of mergers and 
acquisitions of firms to examine how stock prices of related companies reacted to a 
certain news release about a firm’s movement. Researchers have also applied the methods 
to investigate impacts of innovation news such as acquisition of new patents and 
development of new technologies. In agribusiness related fields, researchers have 
investigated firms’ market reactions to food safety issues or farm policy legislation.  
Salin and Hooker (2001) investigated abnormal daily returns of companies that 
recalled products due to microbial infections. Applying the methods described in 
Mackinlay (1997), they selected four different food recall events using three companies 
from 1996 to 1998 in the U.S. They calculated single-day abnormal returns using -5 to 5 
day event windows and cumulative abnormal returns in 5, 10, 20 and 30 post-event days. 
They concluded the stock market reactions were firm-specific and more significant for a 
small-size company and larger recall incidents. The volatility of daily returns was 
examined and determined that the food recall events increased the volatility of the returns.         
Detre et al. (2008) investigated how the value of agribusiness firms have changed 
in response to procedures of legislations of the U.S. farm bills over the past 40 years. 
Specifically, they selected different key dates during the legislation procedures, such as 
the dates the conference report is filed, the president’s signing into public law, and when a 
bill is introduced in a chamber. They conclude that agribusinesses react on the date 
legislation emerges from the joint House and Senate conference committee. 
Numerous studies have estimated the economic impacts of highly contagious 
animal disease outbreaks on an industry (e.g., Pendell et al. (2007), Paarlberg et al. 
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(2009)). However, there is no known published research that has analyzed the impacts of 
highly contagious animal disease outbreaks on the value of related firms. The closest 
published paper, authored by Henson and Mazzocchi (2002), investigated the impacts of 
BSE to agribusiness firms. The event used was the British government’s announcement 
that confirmed the link between BSE and human health in March 1996. Twenty-four 
agribusiness firms were selected and grouped into four areas: (1) beef, (2) other meat, (3) 
dairy, and (4) feed and pet food. Henson and Mazzocchi found that the firms in a number 
of sectors were negatively affected by the announcement, most notably and obviously, 
beef processing firms, but also processors of dairy products, animal feed, and pet food. 
The only firms included in the analysis that were positively impacted were manufacturers 
of other meats. Although this study is based on a secondary event following an animal 
health issue, this study is the first attempt to examine impacts of an animal health related 
event on how the event affected related agribusiness firms’ securities. 
 
Literature on Assessing Economic Impacts of FMD Outbreaks in Korea 
After terminations of the outbreaks in 2000, 2002, and 2010-2011, the Korea Rural 
Economic Institute (KREI) published white papers on the FMD outbreaks and their 
economic impacts with supervision of the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery (MIFAFF). First, KREI confirmed primary damages in the livestock production 
computing the number of animal culled and production loss due to the culled animals. 
Second, KREI attempted to estimate secondary impacts on the broader economy, 
implementing different methods for each case. KREI concluded that all cases caused 
substantial losses to the livestock industry, its allied business and the entire economy.  
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Roh et al. (2008) estimated the impacts of the 2000 and 2002 outbreaks on pork 
and beef prices using a GARCH model and Box and Tiao’s intervention analysis model. 
They found that prices dropped 15% to 20% before the government began an intervention 
program after the first outbreak. However, the drop in price was much smaller after the 
2002 outbreak due to government appropriate and prompt intervention. Park et al. (2006) 
also investigated economic impact of the 2000 outbreak on meat prices and concluded the 
outbreak caused a temporary price shock to the Korean meat market. Additionally, they 
found that the decline in price took 16 months to recover.  
The studies described above that have examined the economic impacts of the 
FMD outbreaks concluded significant economic impacts on the livestock production and 
meat market sectors. In addition, all found or implied that the outbreaks also caused 
significant losses to related or allied companies. However, there has not been any 
research that investigates the FMD outbreaks’ impact on the value of firms that were 
affected by the incidents.  
 
Contribution of This Study 
There is an extensive literature estimating the economic impacts of animal disease 
outbreaks. Most of these studies have used partial equilibrium, Input-Output, computable 
general equilibrium and/or linear programming models to estimate the economic impacts 
to producers and consumers. 
Although this research is similar to past work (i.e., the applied event study 
methodology on the agribusiness sectors), it is different because it is the first known 
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study to investigate the impacts of a highly contagious animal disease outbreak on the 
value of livestock and allied firms. More specifically, this study will: 
 Provide information for managers and shareholders of related companies, which 
will enable them to develop strategies to protect their assets and prevent investors’ 
negative movement on their investments. 
 Yield practical information for investors on how an animal disease outbreak 
could impact their returns of related firms, and what patterns of returns the 
outbreaks produce, so investors may able to make better decisions on their 
investments. 
 Support theoretical background to policy makers and research institutes for 
establishing proper governmental intervention programs to minimize damages 














MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
This chapter describes how an event study methodology is conducted in this study. 
Additionally, discussion of the events, sample companies, and data occur in this section. 
Measuring abnormal returns and testing for significance are explained both for abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns. This is followed by a discussion on volatility. 
  
Procedure of Event Study Methodology 
Identifying Events 
As described in Mackinlay (1997), identifying an event and event window is the first step 
to conducting an event study. The event is any objective event of interest, and the event 
window specifies the period over which the stock prices of the firms involved in this 
event will be examined. This research’s events are five FMD outbreaks in Korea between 
2000 and 2010. Table 1 summarizes notable dates and durations of the events.  
Before identifying the event window, identification of the correct event date is 
crucial in event studies (Armitage, 1995). There are three noteworthy dates in the FMD 
outbreaks in Korea: (1) notification, (2) confirmation, and (3) termination. The 
notification date is the date when the first case was notified by the Korean government. 
The confirmation and termination dates are the dates when the first case was confirmed to 
be FMD virus by the Korean government and when the last case was confirmed, 
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respectively. Following Salin and Hooker (2001), the official announcement by the 
Korean government (i.e., confirmation date) is considered to be exact event date used in 
this research.  
Identifying the event window is the next step and is important in an event study. 
Armitage (1995) and Mackinlay (1997) recommended defining the event window to be 
larger than a period of interest because this permits examination of the period 
surrounding the event. It is suggested that the length of the event window would depend 
on the topic being studied. Armitage (1995) concluded that two-day event windows are 
common in the finance literature, if the event date can be determined with precision. 
Additionally, two-day event windows should be supplemented by cumulative abnormal 
returns for longer periods after the event window. Following two studies in the 
agribusiness literature, Detre et al. (2008) and Salin and Hooker (2001), five-day pre- and 
post-event windows are used in this study (i.e., -5 to +5 days of an event date). Five-day 
pre- and post-event windows are chosen for two reasons: (1) each case had a notification 
date one or two days prior to the event date, and five-day pre-event windows can cover 
impacts of the notifications as well as any leakage of information to the stock market and 
(2) five-day post-event windows are preferable because all outbreaks last more than five 
days.            
 
Determining Firms for Event Study  
After identifying the event and the event window, the companies being evaluated are 
chosen. This study selected 18 different agribusiness firms that are grouped into six 
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different categories. Tables 4 and 5 summarize basic information and characteristics of 
the companies. Four groups in the meat and seafood business are selected as well as two 
groups in the input business. The six groups include: (1) pork, (2) poultry, (3) seafood,  
(4) imported meat, (5) feed, and (6) vaccine. In each group, three companies are selected 
based on availability of public information and the dates that the companies began 
trading publically.  
For the pork group, Sunjin Holdings (SJ), Farmsco (FC), and Farmstory 
Hannaeng (FH) are chosen. These three companies are fresh pork processors and are the 
top competitors in the branded pork market in Korea. All three companies have similar 
business characteristics including: integrated companies that have swine farms, 
slaughtering houses, processing and packing facilities, and sales departments. 
Additionally, all three companies own and operate livestock feed plants which supply a 
formulated feed mixture to its own farms and member farms. In 2010, approximately 50% 
of revenue for these firms is from pork with the remaining 50% of sales from feed. This 
study classifies these companies into the pork group, and not the feed group, because 
consumers perceive them as branded pork companies. Because the companies became 
publically traded in different years, only Sunjin is included in all five events while the 
other two companies are included in the 2002 and 2010 events.     
The poultry group includes: Harim (HR), Maniker (MK), and Dongwoo (DW). 
These companies produce fresh and processed poultry products and have the highest 
market shares for fresh chicken (combined they have more than 50% market share of the 
fresh chicken market in Korea). Harim has the highest market share of 32%. Both 
Maniker and Dongwoo process whole poultry and their gross revenues are about 50% of 
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Harim. Harim is included in all events while Maniker is included in the 2002 and 2010 
events and Dongwoo is only included in the 2010 events.  
The seafood group is comprised of three seafood-specialized companies: 
Dongwon Industries (DI), Sajo Industries (SI), and Oyang (OY). Their businesses are 
fundamentally based on the deep-sea fishing industry. However, they have distinct 
business characteristics in a final product perspective. Dongwon is strongly specialized in 
canned tuna products, Sajo emphasizes more on supplying raw tuna to retailers and 
restaurants, and Oyang specializes in processed fish products. These companies could 
play important roles if consumers reduce meat consumption. More precisely, if 
consumers substitute their meat consumption with seafood, Dongwon and Oyang can 
directly benefit from the substitution. However, Sajo’s raw tuna products do not gain 
immediate benefits because raw tuna is considered to be a luxury good in Korea and 
cannot easily replace the reduced meat consumption. All three companies are included in 
all five events.        
 Companies in the imported meat group have complex characteristics. Dongaone 
(DA) is a wheat flour and feed company and owns a subsidiary, Donga Food, that imports 
and sales meat. Hanil Feed (HF) is primarily a feed company, but merged with a meat 
importing and processing company, Hankook Nangjang, in 2003. Atinum Investment (AI) 
is an investment company that owns a subsidiary, KR Food and Company, which is 
involved in meat import and sales. This group is only included in the 2010 events because 
these companies became publically traded or began in the meat-import business after 




 The feed group had three companies that only manufacture animal feed: 
Woosung Feed (WS), Korea Industry (KI), and KC Feed (KC). In term of gross revenue, 
Woosung Feed is the largest among the three companies with 324 billion won (281 
million USD) of gross revenue in 2010. Its market share consisted of 3.7% of the Korean 
feed market. In 2010, Korea Industry and KC Feed had market shares of 1.8% and 1.1%, 
respectively. All three companies are included in all five events. 
 Three vaccine and veterinary medicine companies are selected for this study. 
Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory (CV), Eagle Veterinary Technology (EV), and Cheil Bio 
(CB) are all classified in the pharmacy industry section of the Korea stock market. They 
are small in size with gross revenues around 16 billion won (14 million USD). This group 
is only included for the 2010 events because the companies began to be publically traded 
on the Korean stock market after 2002. Additionally, emergency vaccination was only 
applied in the third outbreak in 2010.  
 
Hypotheses of the Stock Market Reaction by Group 
The direction of stock price reactions is hypothesized by the groups of companies before 
calculating abnormal reruns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). First, the 
pork and feed groups are tested under a hypothesis of negative AR and CAR. KREI (2002) 
surveyed meat consumers during the 2002 FMD outbreak and found that 49.5% 
responded that they would reduce their red meat consumption. In addition, KREI (2011) 
estimated that swine sales declined by 30% as a result of the FMD outbreak. These facts 
obviously indicate that the pork companies are negatively affected by the FMD outbreaks. 
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KREI (2000) estimated that the 2000 outbreak cost 13 billion won (11 million USD) to 
the feed industry. During the 2010-2011 outbreak, approximately 3.5 million livestock 
were culled (which was 26.7% of total cattle and swine population) in Korea. This 
indicates that feed companies lost approximately one fourth of their product end users. 
With the KREI’s estimation, the reduction of livestock population makes it possible to 
hypothesize a negative stock value return to the feed companies. 
The groups of poultry, seafood, imported meat, and vaccine are hypothetically 
assumed to have positive AR and CAR. Mangen and Burrell (1999) estimated consumers’ 
preference shifts in the Netherlands due to the BSE scare. They concluded that changing 
preferences reduced beef’s share by 4.9% and increased those of poultry and fish by 4.1% 
and 5.2%, respectively. Trend Monitor Co. (2011) surveyed Korean meat consumers on 
how they changed the pattern of their meat consumption during the third 2010 FMD 
outbreak and found that 60.1% and 30.9% of people who reduced their red meat 
consumption switched to seafood and chicken, respectively. These results support the 
hypothesis of a positive stock market reaction of the seafood and poultry group. Baek 
(2011) analyzed companies in the stock market that were benefited from the 2010 
outbreak and included meat import companies and vaccine companies as earning firms 
from the event.  
 
Estimating Normal Returns 
Evaluating impacts of the events on stock values require a measure of abnormal returns. 
The abnormal return is an actual ex-post return of the security over the event window 
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minus the normal return of a firm over the event window. The normal return is defined as 
the expected return. The abnormal return is estimated as follows: 
   - ( )it it it tAR R E R X                                        (1) 
where itAR , itR , and ( )it tE R X  are the abnormal return, actual return, and normal 
return, respectively, for firm i and event date t.  
 As discussed previously, Armitage (1995) and Mackinlay (1997) reviewed 
different models for the normal return estimation and concluded that the market model by 
an OLS is the most suitable model to estimate the normal returns. As such, this study uses 
the OLS market model. The OLS market model is:  
  it = +  + it i i mtR R                                                 (2) 
 it( ) = 0E  , 2itvar( ) =                                                (3)  
where itR  and mtR  are the return of the event time t on stock of firm i and the market 
portfolio, respectively.  i  and i  are the estimated coefficients, and it  is the error 
term and is assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance.  
This research uses Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) as the market 
portfolio ( mtR ) because it is the most representative stock market index in Korea. The 
estimation period differs by researcher; Peterson’s (1989) estimation period ranges from 
100 to 300 days while Armitage (1995) recommends 250 trading days or one calendar 
year. Therefore, this study uses both the 250-day and 300-day daily returns prior to the 
test period (-5 to +5 days of an event day) to obtain more precise regression results.  
The 2000, 2002, and first 2010 outbreaks have sufficient preceding days to 
estimate parameters of the market model. However, the second and third outbreaks in 
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2010 have only 67 trading days and 160 trading days between the first and second 
outbreaks, respectively. As a result, the normal return estimation for the first 2010 
outbreak is used for all three outbreaks in 2010. 
 
Autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
The estimated parameters from the market model are used to calculate abnormal returns 
associated with the events to be examined. However, this routine requires strong 
statistical assumptions that are pointed out as potential important problems, especially 
using daily return data (Brown and Warner, 1985). These problems result in lowering 
efficiency of the model; hence the parameters estimated.  
One of these assumptions is that the error term, it , is uncorrelated. However, 
this assumption has been questioned and documented that returns on individual stocks are 
correlated (Lo and Mackinlay, 1998). Therefore, normal return regression results are 
tested for serial correlation and corrected for first-order serial correlation when detected 
for serial correlation (Gujurati and Porter, 2008). When normal return regression results 
for companies are re-estimated correcting for the serial correlation, re-estimated 
parameters will replace original parameters. 
The second assumption of the market model is that the error terms follow a 
normal distribution with constant variance (Brown and Warner, 1985). Giaccoto and Ali 
(1982) have shown that the error terms from regressions involving stock returns are 
rarely normally distributed. As a result, if the assumption of homoscedasticity cannot be 
satisfied, the standard tests to measure the impact of an event on stock prices must be 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Otherwise, the parameters estimated may be inefficient, 
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and any inferences could be potentially misleading. This study tests and corrects all 
models for heteroskedasticity using the White test (Gujurati and Porter, 2008). Re-
estimated parameters will be used for further steps substituting original parameters.       
 
Calculation of Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the abnormal return (AR) is calculated by 
subtraction the expected return from the actual return. The equation for calculating AR is; 
 )  - ( + i i mtit itAR R R                                             (4) 
where itAR , itR , and  ( + )i i mtR   are the abnormal return, actual return, and 
expected return, respectively, for firm i and event date t. The test period is 11 days from  
-5 day and +5 day from an event date, designating the event date as day 0.  
 Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is an aggregation of multiple-day ARs of the 
post-event window. Maclinlay (1997) pointed out that CAR is important to monitor 











ARCAR t t                                           (5) 






AR  are the cumulative abnormal return and summation 
of the abnormal returns between 1t  to 2t , respectively. Following Salin and Hooker 
(2001), this study adopts four post-event CAR windows: 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, and 30-
day windows. These periods are also reasonable because the FMD outbreaks last between 
14 to 33 trading days for the first four outbreaks.  
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Test of Significance for Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Brown and Warner (1985) and Armitage (1995) confirmed that a standard t-test is 
appropriate for a significance test for ARs and CARs. The tests seek to prove whether 
ARs and CARs are significantly different from zero and will be performed with null 
hypotheses as: 
 0 :   0itH AR  ,   1 :   0itH AR                                       (6) 
 0 :  C  0itH AR  , 1 :  C  0itH AR                                      (7) 
Mackinlay (1997) pointed out that the test of these hypotheses can be conducted under an 
assumption that the distributions of AR and CAR are normally distributed as 
 2 ~  (0,  ( ))i ititAR N AR                                             (8) 
 2
1 2 1 2 ( )( ,  ) ~  (0, ,  )i iCAR t t N t t                                      (9) 
The test statistic for AR is the ratio of an abnormal return of event day t to its estimated 
standard deviation of the normal return estimation period while the CAR test statistic is 
the ratio of a cumulative abnormal return to its estimated standard deviation. The test 
statistics for AR and CAR are calculated as follows: 
  /  ( ):  -statistics = it itAR t AR AR                                   (10) 
  where 
6
256 or -306








  /  (C ):  -statistics = C it itCAR t AR AR                              (11) 
  where 
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Calculation of Volatility of Daily Returns Before and After the Events 
Volatility is the measure for variability of price of a financial unit over time. Volatility is 
an important factor when discussing stock market returns because it indicates riskiness of 
returns. Many researchers measure volatility in an attempt of determining what factors 
have causality in changing volatility. As a measure of volatility, standard deviation is the 
most representing measure. Specifically, volatility is measured by comparing standard 
deviations of returns of the same time intervals before and after an event (e.g., 50 days, 
100 days, etc). Salin and Hooker (2001) adopted the measure of standard deviation and 
examined volatility. They compared standard deviations of 50-day, 100-day, and 150-day 
intervals before and after food recall events and tested for significance of the differences.  
 This study calculates standard deviations of daily returns of individual firms in 
intervals of 50 days, 100 days, and 150 days before and after the event dates. In other 
words, comparisons of standard deviations of the 50-day interval is from -50 day to -1 
day and +1 day to +50 day; the 100-day interval is from -100 day to -1 day and +1 day to 
+100 day; and the 150 day intervals is from -150 to -1 day and +1 day to +150 day. 
However, there are only 68 trading days between the first and second outbreaks of 2010. 
Therefore, only 50-day interval is applied in the first and second 2010 outbreaks.  
 To test significance of the differences of volatility, F-tests are employed. 
Snedecor and Cochran (1980) illustrate an F-test to test for equality of two standard 
deviations. This test can be a two-tailed test or a one-tailed test. The two-tailed version 
tests against the alternative that the standard deviations are not equal. The one-tailed 
version only tests in one direction (i.e., the standard deviation from the first population is 
either greater than or less than the second population standard deviation). This study is 
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only interested in an increment of volatility due to the disease outbreaks, thus, the one-
tailed test is used. The null hypothesis is: 
  
0 after:   = beforeH                                                       (12)  
1 :   < before afterH    
where 
before  and after  are standard deviations of daily returns before and after the 
events, respectively. The test statistic is; 
 2 2
, , =  / i after i beforeF                                                        (13) 
where 2
,i after  and 
2
,i before  are variance of daily returns of company i after and before the 
events, respectively. The tests are at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
Additionally, the test statistic is modified and re-calculated to normalize or account for 
the change on the market index. In other words, variances of individual companies’ daily 
return are also impacted by change of a market index. This study also calculates an F-
statistic which is weighted by a ratio of variances of the market index in same test periods. 
The modified test statistic is calculated as follows: 
2 2 2 2
, , , , = (  / ) / (  / )i after i before index after index beforeF                            (14) 
where 2,i after , 
2
,i before , 
2
,index after , and 
2
,index before  are variances of company i after and 








The information on financial and operational characteristics of the sample companies in 
tables 4 and 5 are obtained from Yahoo Finance Korea and Daum Finance. The statistics 
on the Korean livestock industry are from the NACF Livestock Industry Statistics Book 
(NACF, 2011). Daily stock prices and the market index (KOSPI) are collected from 

























RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of this study. First, the normal return 
regression results are presented with a summary of statistics of the daily returns. Second, 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of the five outbreaks are discussed by 
the group and event. Finally, volatility of the daily returns are presented and discussed.  
 
Summary Statistics of the Daily Returns of the Estimation Periods 
As previously discussed, the normal return estimation was performed with both 250-day 
and 300-day daily returns to obtain more significant estimates. Between estimates, the 
results with 300-day daily returns were more significant in the 2000 and 2010 events. In 
the 2002 event, 250-day daily returns generated a better result.
4
 
 The summary statistics of the daily returns of the estimation periods are shown in 
Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8. In the 2000 event, only one company in the pork and 
poultry groups, and three companies in the seafood and feed groups were tested. Six 
companies experienced both the upper and lower price limit, while Sunjin and Dongwon 
Industries experienced only the upper price limit.
5
 In the seafood group, the largest 
company, Dongwon Industries, demonstrated smaller variability of daily return (i.e., 4.25% 
                                                 
4
 The estimates of both with 250-day and 300-day daily returns are available from the author upon request.  
5 The price limit of day-trading is positive and negative 15% in the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets. Before 
May 2005, the limit for the KOSDAQ market was 12%. 
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of standard deviation of daily return). Compared to Dongwon Industries, smaller-size 
companies, Sajo Industries and Oyang’s daily returns were more variable. In the feed 
group, a similar pattern occurred. Woosung, the largest company, had 4.36% of standard 
deviation while the two smaller companies had higher variability. Sunjin in the pork 
group was more stable in change of daily return with a maximum of 15.00%, a minimum 
of -10.78%, and a standard deviation of 4.17%. Although Harim, in the poultry group, 
had a larger total asset and gross revenue, it experienced a wider range of variability with 
a standard deviation of 6.06%. 
 For the 2002 event, this study included three companies in pork, seafood, and 
feed groups and two companies in the poultry group. All pork companies have shown a 
daily data of the limit price or very close to the limit price. The poultry companies were 
similar in terms of the range, average, and variability. The seafood companies showed a 
positive relationship between size of the company and variability of daily return similar 
to the data of the 2000 event. In 2002, the feed companies followed the same pattern in 
regards to size and variability of daily returns. However, there were noticeable 
differences between the two time periods. The daily returns in 2000 were 22% to 97% 
more variable than those in 2002. Furthermore, average daily returns were mostly higher 
in the 2002 compare to 2000. The higher variability and lower daily returns in 2000 was 
an effect of the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis in Korea (Koo, 2001). 
 The summary statistics for 2010 showed similar results as those of 2002. Table 8 
displays the summary statistics of the 2010 estimation period. One difference from the 
previous periods is the inclusion of imported meat and vaccine groups in 2010. In the 
imported meat group, Dongawon had the lowest average daily return and standard 
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deviation. The vaccine group was highly variable in daily returns ranging from 4.83% to 
6.56% of standard deviation.           
 
Normal Return Regression Results 
This study estimated the normal returns using the OLS market model. The results for the 
normal returns for individual companies by year are shown in Table 9, Table 10, and 
Table 11. All models were tested for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. If serial 
correlation was detected, after-correction statistics are reported. Tables include Durban-
Watson d- statistics, with after-correction statistics when one was detected for serial 
correlation. The tables also contains White test χ2-statistics with a denotation of 
significance level when one was detected for heteroskedasticity. When the test detected 
and corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, corrected parameters and other 
values such as model F-statistics and R
2
 replaced the original results. 
 The estimated beta’s in the regression results across all three time periods were 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. The regression F-statistics were also 
highly significant at 1% significance level, except for Harim in 2000. In 2000, first-order 
serial correlation was detected and corrected for in three companies (i.e., SJ, HR, and KC) 
while two companies (i.e., SI and OY) were corrected for heteroskedasticity. The 2002 
results suggest the companies did not bear any serial correlation, but three companies (i.e., 
SJ, DI, and WS) were corrected for heteroskedasticity. In the 2010 results, one company 
(i.e., HR) was corrected for the first-order serial correlation, and two companies (i.e., SJ 
and SI) were corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
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Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This section discusses the calculated abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs). Each event will be discussed in separate subsections and comparisons. 
Table 12 through Table 16 details the results. The tables show values of ARs and CARs 
by company and event, attaching t-statistics of each AR and CAR.  
Abnormal returns partly show significant values matching with the prior 
hypothetical assumptions of direction of the reaction. However, some companies were 
followed by immediate bounce back in the other direction. Cumulative abnormal returns 
showed more significant results indicating that lengthy-lasting events, such as an animal 
disease outbreak, affect the stock market more gradually than instantaneously. However, 
some groups reacted to the opposite direction from the hypothetical assumption which is 
interpreted as impacts of other direct factors to groups.  
        
The 2000 Event 
The ARs and CARs of the 2000 event indicate that the disease outbreak had impacts on 
stock prices. Furthermore, the directions of reaction mostly matched with the 
hypothetical assumption. The ARs and CARs of the 2000 event can be found in Table 12.  
The companies analyzed in this research realized significant ARs in different 
event dates. Sunjin in the pork group showed statistically insignificant negative ARs on 
day 0 and day 2, but plummeted on day 3 and day 5 with highly significant ARs of -14.00% 
and -14.09%, respectively. Harim, in the poultry group, experienced statistically 
significant positive ARs on day 0 (11.49%), day 3 (12.33%), and day 5 (12.01%) with 
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insignificant negative ARs between the event dates (day 1, day 2, and day 4 had ARs of  
-8.25%, -8.48%, and -3.57%, respectively).  
The feed group did not react immediately to the FMD announcement, but reacted 
significantly on day 2. Woosung showed significant ARs on day 2, day 3, and day 5 with 
ARs of -10.07%, -13.27%, and -13.52%, respectively. KC Feed also had -11.89% of AR 
on day 2, but ARs bounced back on day 3 and day 5. Additionally, Korea Industry 
appeared to have a significant negative AR of -14.01% on day 2, and additional negative 
returns on the following event days.   
Compared to the pork, poultry, and feed companies, the companies in the seafood 
group showed indiscernible ARs. Oyang demonstrated a strong positive AR on day 0 
(15.01%), but the other two companies showed insignificant ARs. Moreover, Sajo 
Industries and Oyang had significant negative ARs the following day, but the group 
showed little reaction for the rest of the test period.  
Supporting the AR result, CARs also confirmed an existence of impacts of the 
disease outbreak. Sunjin, in the pork group, significant CARs were -20.20%, -37.93%,   
-34.87%, and -31.48% in 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, and 30-day post-event windows, 
respectively (Table 12). Harim in the poultry group showed positive CARs in 5-day and 
10-day windows, but were not significant at the 10% level. Unexpectedly, significant 
negative CARs occurred in the 20-day and 30-day windows. As expected, the feed 
companies had negative CARs. Korea Industry experienced the highest loss of their stock 
value with significant CARs of -21.47%, -24.14%, -26.81%, and -38.03% in 5-day to 30-




 In summary, the stock market reactions to the pork, poultry, and feed companies 
were as expected. The FMD outbreak posed a ban on pork exports, resulting in an 
unexpected market loss which caused investors to reassess the value of the pork company. 
The poultry company benefited from the disease outbreak, but the impacts did not last 
longer than 10 days after the event date. The feed companies experienced negative 
reactions because the outbreak caused a reduction of their revenue as estimated by KREI 
(2000). The seafood companies did not show any obvious reaction to the disease outbreak. 
This might suggest that the market did not believe that the seafood group would benefit 
from the disease outbreak. Additionally, it appears that the reactions began on day 2, 
March 29
th
. KREI (2000) explained that the Korean government described the disease as 
“suspected FMD” when it made an announcement on March 27
th
. The government sent a 
blood sample of an infected animal to the United Kingdom to confirm the infection. The 
test results confirmed the FMD virus on April 2
nd
. Therefore, it is possible that the 
delayed reaction was due to the confusion surrounding the procedure of confirming the 
infection.            
   
The 2002 Event   
The stock market reactions to the 2002 FMD outbreak were noticeably different when 
compared to the 2000 FMD outbreak. Overall, the reactions of the pork and poultry 
companies met prior expectations while the seafood and feed companies did not match 
prior expectations. Table 13 lists the ARs and CARs for the 2002 event.  
In the pork group, all three companies had statistically insignificant negative ARs 
for day 0 and day 5. The CARs for Sunjin were negative in 10-day (-6.98%), 20-day    
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(-19.36%), and 30-day (-16.04%) post-event windows. The other two companies in the 
pork group (i.e., FC and FH) had unexpected positive CARs in 20-day (5.64%) and 30-
day (4.43%) for FC and 30-day (4.61%) for FH. The result is suspected to be unrelated to 
the FMD outbreak.  
Two companies in the poultry group appeared to show the most distinguishing 
results in the 2002 event. The companies had positive ARs around the event date. Harim 
had significant ARs of 10.94%, 12.00%, and 6.99% on day -1, day 0, and day 1, 
respectively. Maniker also had positive ARs on the same event days, but only statistically 
significant on day 0. Both companies experienced the opposite-direction ARs on day 2. 
The CARs for the poultry companies did not show any significant values suggesting that 
the impacts were short lived. 
 Similar to the result of the 2000 event, the seafood group did not have an obvious 
reaction to the event. The stock prices of those three companies all rose on day 0, but 
only Oyang showed a statistically significant value of 10.88%. CARs were not apparent 
either, except for Dongwon Industries which showed positive CARs in 5-day and 10-day 
periods.  
 One difference when compared to the 2000 event is that the feed companies 
showed an indiscernible result. Woosung did not claim any significant ARs or CARs 
throughout the test period. KC Feed had a positive AR on day -3 and a negative AR on 
day 3, but had two positive CARs in 20-day and 30-day intervals. Korea Industry had a 
strong and negative AR on day -1, but had strong positive ARs in the two previous days. 
Similar to KC Feed, Korea Industry had strong positive CARs in 20-day and 30-day post-
event periods.  
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 Some of the results for the 2002 event confirmed the impacts on daily returns of 
related firms’ stock prices, but the magnitude of the impacts were significantly lower than 
the impacts of the 2000 case. For instance, CARs of Sunjin in the pork groups 
substantially decreased, and the feed group companies did not show any statistically 
significant negative reaction. As KREI (2002) describes, the immediate and appropriate 
government actions minimized disturbance to the livestock industry and its related 
market. The government established an emergent task-force team to prevent the spread of 
the disease and to strengthen educating programs for consumers. As a result, the prices of 
beef cattle and swine did not decline after the outbreak compared to the price before the 
outbreak, whereas the prices of beef cattle and swine declined by 1.4% and 15.9%, 
respectively, after the 2000 outbreak. KREI (2002) concluded that the prompt and 
appropriate response dampened the negative economic impacts. This research could also 
be interpreted that the government timely response is one of the reasons of stability of the 
stock market reaction.  
 
The First 2010 Event 
The first FMD outbreak in 2010 also caused an abnormal reaction of related firms’ stock 
prices. However, the reaction became lengthier over the post-event time interval. The 
firms’ reactions met expectations for all groups, except for the pork and imported meat 
groups. Table 14 presents the calculated ARs and CARs.  
 The pork group had an unexpected positive reaction to this event. The single-
day ARs were not significant while the CARs were significant. Sunjin’s CARs were 
5.89%, 7.75%, 6.27%, and 4.17% in 5-day to 30-day periods, respectively. Farmsco 
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experienced mixed impacts of 12.23%, -12.83%, and -7.17% of CARs in 10-day, 20-day, 
and 30-days test-periods, respectively. Farmstory Hannaeng had negative CARs, but the 
values were small and statistically insignificant. One factor that could explain the pork 
firms’ unexpected reactions is due to the nature of the outbreak. The first FMD outbreak 
in 2010 was the smallest case of the five outbreaks and only happened in beef and dairy 
cattle.  
In the poultry and seafood groups, single-day ARs were generally not significant. 
However, the firms in these two groups clearly reacted for a longer period of time. In the 
poultry group, Harim showed 7.37% of CAR in the 5-day interval, and Maniker 
accumulated CARs to 5.58%, 16.64%, 24.84%, and 35.33% in 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, and 
30-day post-event windows, respectively. Dongwoo also showed 3.65% and 4.63% of 
CARs in 5-day and 10-day post-event periods, respectively. The seafood companies did 
not show any significant reactions on the single-day calculations but showed significant 
results in aggregation of CARs. Dongwon Industries had 5.87%, 12.12%, and 8.31% of 
CARs in 10-day, 20-day, and 30-day intervals, respectively. Sajo Industries experienced 
positive reactions in a shorter period of post-event windows with 5-day and 10-day CARs 
at 10.68% and 5.16%, respectively. Oyang had CARs of 9.15% and 5.99% in the 5-day 
and 10-day intervals. The results from the poultry and seafood groups conform to our 
prior expectations about having a positive reaction. With the seafood companies showing 
a positive reaction for a first time in this study, it is possible to interpret that the stock 
market began to realize this group of companies as a beneficiary in the FMD outbreak.  
Results from the imported meat group showed mixed results. Hanil Feed had a 
strong positive AR (13.69%) on day 1; however, a strong negative return occurred the 
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following day. Furthermore, the CARs on the post-event intervals were all negative. 
Dongawon did not show any significant AR and CAR in this event window. Only Atinum 
Investment showed positive CARs in 5-day (11.20%) and 10-day (10.01%) post-event 
windows.  
The stock prices of the feed companies had negative response, which met prior 
expectations. Similar to other groups, the three companies did not show any significant 
ARs but had significant CARs. Woosung had negative CARs of -3.80% and -9.83% in 
20-day and 30-day post-event intervals, respectively. KC Feed had negative CARs 
throughout all the post-event test periods of -3.53%, -4.87%, -5.20%, and -11.11% in   
5-day to 30-day test periods, respectively. Korea Industry only showed a negative CAR 
of -2.80% in the 10-day test period.  
The vaccine companies realized positive reactions to the event with a moderate 
level of abnormality. However, this result is meaningful because this group was tested 
only for the three 2010 events and had positive reactions was hypothesized. Eagle 
Veterinary Technology and Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory had a significant level of 
ARs on day 3 with values of 8.53% and 16.07%, respectively. Cheil Bio also showed an 
AR of 5.27% on day 3, but the value was not statistically significant. In aggregations of 
ARs, all three companies showed positive values in 5-day and 10-day test windows. 
However, only the 10-day CAR of Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory was statistically 
significant.  
The stock market reactions for the first 2010 event were generally insignificant 
for the ARs, but the CARs had a number of significant values. In addition, there were 
more significant CARs in shorter test periods, such as 5-day and 10-day, than the longer 
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test periods. The result is due to the magnitude and duration of the event. The FMD 
outbreak in January 2010 was the smallest event out of the five events in terms of 
durations and number of confirmed cases. This outbreak lasted for only 19 trading days 
with six confirmed cases. Therefore, the shorter duration and smaller number of 
confirmed cases helps explain the stock market reaction for the first 2010 event.  
 
The Second 2010 Event 
In the second FMD event in 2010, the stock market reactions did not meet prior 
expectations and were different (i.e., opposite reaction) when compared to the other 
events. The ARs and CARs for the second 2010 outbreak can be found in Table 15.  
 The pork group companies’ responses had relatively positive returns to the 
outbreak. Considering that the results of the 2002 and the first 2010 outbreaks did not 
have obvious negative reactions, this result suggests that the FMD outbreak is no longer a 
threat that outweighs other market factors unless a FMD outbreak is directly related or 
substantially damages to the swine industry. Almost all significant values of ARs and 
CARs in this group were positive values, except the negative CARs of Farmstory 
Hannaeng.  
The poultry group showed the most unusual reaction to this event. Harim and 
Maniker had single-day ARs of 5.44% and 4.74% on day -1, respectively, when the first 
case was notified. These single-day positive ARs conformed to our hypothesis. However, 
most of the ARs after day 0 were negative and the CARs for two companies were 
significantly negative. This indicates that the news of the FMD outbreak momentarily 
affected the stock prices, but the impact was rapidly offset by other factors. The primary 
 
43 
factor was the market outlook of the chicken market for the second quarter in 2010 which 
was gloomy as the number of broilers increased from the previous year. Specifically, the 
broiler price plummeted by 19.8% from 4,066 won/kg in January to 3,260 won/kg in May 
(NACF, 2010). This market condition had more significant impact on the companies’ 
stock prices and offset the positive influence of the FMD outbreak.  
The seafood companies did not show any significant single-day ARs but showed 
mostly positive CARs in the longer time-periods. These results met our hypothesis that 
consumers would switch to eating more seafood, thus impact the stock values of those 
companies.  
The stock market reaction to the imported meat companies was unclear for this 
event. Dangawon had several significant single-day ARs (mostly before day 0), but it is 
not appropriate to conclude that the result is an impact of the FMD factor because the 
notification of the infection was one previous day before the confirmation. However, the 
company realized positive CARs of 5.24% and 13.90% in 20-day and 30-day post-event 
periods which meets the prior expectation. This result was not consistent when it came to 
the other two companies. Hanil Feed and Atinum Investment had CARs of -4.39% and  
-9.46% and -12.17% and -13.94% in 20-day and 30-day post-event intervals, respectively.  
 Similar to the poultry category, the feed category also had an abnormal reaction 
in the second 2010 outbreak. Woosung accumulated CARs of 8.68% and 21.87% in 5-day 
and 10-day post-event periods. KC Feed showed even higher level of CARs with 4.53%, 
64.37%, 35.31% and 65.37% in 5-day to 30-day post-event periods, respectively. This 
positive response for an input supplier is contrary to the hypothesis. The vaccine 
companies, another input supplier, reacted to the outbreak positively, as expected. All 
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three vaccine companies showed significant single-day ARs on day 1 and significant 
CARs in 10-day and 20-day post-event test periods. From the onset, KREI (2011) stated 
that there was a strong argument of implementing emergency vaccination as this outbreak 
occurred three months after the previous outbreak. Although the government decided not 
to vaccinate in this event, the stock prices of vaccine companies strongly benefited from 
this situation.  
  
The Third 2010 Event  
The final FMD outbreak, starting in November 2010, was the worst outbreak among the 
five sample events in this study. Furthermore, it was one of the worst FMD outbreaks in 
the world. One essential point of this outbreak is that the outbreak began in a swine 
operation and primarily impacted the swine industry. The stock market reaction showed 
statistically significant results mostly in multi-day CARs than single-day ARs. However, 
in the poultry, seafood, and imported meat groups, the direction of the reaction did not 
meet prior expectations. One possible factor that could have been impacting the stock 
prices of these groups is the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak during 
the same period. Table 16 displays the calculated ARs and CARs.  
 Companies in the pork group generally had a negative stock market reaction. 
However, the reaction was more significant in multi-day accumulations indicating the 
reactions occurred at gradual pace. Sunjin had a significant CAR of -5.31% while 
Farmsco’s CAR was -10.51% in 20-day time interval. Farmstory Hannaeng showed     




The poultry companies had significant CARs, but the direction of CARs was 
opposite of prior expectations. According to the Animal Plant and Fisheries Quarantine 
and Inspection Agency in Korea (2012), HPAI occurred between December 10, 2010 and 
February 2012. This HPAI outbreak had more impact on the daily returns of the poultry 
companies than the FMD outbreak.  
 The seafood group had significant negative impacts, but all in multi-day CARs. 
Dongwon Industries declined -4.47% in 5-day period, and Sajo Industries lost -3.70% 
and -8.44% in 5-day and 10-day periods, respectively. Oyang’s stock prices fell -7.04% 
and -11.23% in 10-day and 20-day post-event time periods, respectively. The negative 
abnormal reactions lessened in 30-day post-event window. 
 The imported meat group had a negative reaction in shorter post-event test 
periods, but had a significantly positive reaction in the 30-day window. This pattern 
suggests that the stock market put more of a premium on those companies as the outbreak 
became more severe, and consumers worried more about domestic meat products.  
 Two input supplying groups showed relatively significant results that met prior 
expectations. KC Feed and Korea Industries had declines in CARs of -9.97% and       
-18.65%, and -7.90% and -12.13% in 20-day and 30-day test periods, respectively. In the 
vaccine group, all three companies displayed significant single-day ARs on day 0; Eagle 
Veterinary Technology was 14.26%, Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory was 14.99%, and 
Cheil Bio was 14.84%. In the post-event test windows, Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory 
showed 20.50% and 12.83% in 5-day and 10-day periods, respectively, while Cheil Bio 
had a CAR of 17.19% in the 30-day period. Although other CARs were not statistically 
significant, they all had positive values.        
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Comparison by Event 
In order to compare the stock market reaction by event, the magnitude of the outbreaks 
should be standardized and quantified. However, available information on the five FMD 
outbreaks is not enough to standardize and quantify the magnitude of the outbreaks. The 
information on the outbreaks included qualitative measures such as duration of outbreak, 
number of confirmed cases, and number of animal culled. With these figures, it is not 
possible to compare magnitudes of each outbreak, and it needs an appropriate model to 
quantify the magnitude of each outbreak. Therefore, this study fails to compare the stock 
market reactions of each outbreak. This is one limitation of this study that can be 
investigated in further research.  
 
Volatility of Daily Returns 
Volatility of daily returns increased after the FMD outbreaks and showed more significant 
values in the recent events. Incidentally, increased volatility is meaningful only if it 
corresponds with reactions that satisfied the hypothetical assumptions. If a group’s 
reaction showed to the opposite direction from the hypothetical assumption, it could be 
due to other factors than the FMD outbreak. Hence, a change of volatility can be a mixed 
effect of the FMD outbreaks and other factors. Therefore, this result will encounter 
significant cases that showed significant and matching stock price reactions.  
In 2000, Sunjin in the pork group and Sajo Industries in the seafood group 
showed a significant change of volatility, showing standard deviation of 5.59 in 150-day 
post-event window compared to 4.45 in 150-day pre-event window for Sunjin and 5.08 in 
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150-day post-event window compared to 4.48 in 150-day pre-event window for Sajo 
industries. The magnitude of change was not substantial, but it is meaningful for Sunjin 
because this company showed significant CARs in all test periods. This is the worst 
scenario for a firm as this company lost a great amount of its value as well as stability of 
its stock price. Other companies did not show any statistically significant increment of 
volatility in this event.       
In the 2002 event, more companies faced increasing volatility. Similar to the 
2000 event, Sunjin experienced more variable daily returns after the event and the 
increment approximately by 50% for 100-day and 150-day test periods. Maniker, in the 
poultry group, also had increased volatility of daily returns in all test periods. Dongwon 
Industries and Oyang, in the seafood group, also experienced an increase of volatility in 
both of the 100-day and 150-day periods. Those companies in the poultry and seafood 
groups realized positive stock market reactions to the FMD outbreak, but the volatility, 
the riskiness of return, also increased. This suggests that managers and shareholders of 
these companies need to be more caution to the FMD outbreaks.  
 In the first two outbreaks in 2010, only a 50-day interval was tested because the 
longer test periods overlap as there were only 68 trading days between the two outbreaks. 
In the first outbreak, a relatively small number of companies experienced increased 
volatility. Two companies in the poultry group, Harim and Maniker, had a significant 
increased volatility from 1.60 to 3.64 and 1.90 to 2.73 of standard deviations in 50-day 
pre- and post-event windows, respectively. KC Feed and Korea Industry also had 
increased volatility from 1.32 to 1.99 and 2.45 to 2.95 of standard deviations, respectively. 
More companies experienced higher volatility after the event date in the second 2010 
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outbreak. Two companies in each of the pork, poultry, and seafood groups had increased 
volatility. The stock market prices for the companies in the vaccine group increased as 
hypothesized, but their volatility also substantially increased for all post-event time 
periods. The changes of standard deviations from 50-day pre-event window to 50-day 
post-event window were 0.87 to 5.65 of Eagle Veterinary Technology, 2.10 to 6.58 of 
Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory, and 1.93 to 5.38 of Cheil Bio.  
 In the last outbreak in 2010, additional companies showed increment of volatility. 
Considering that this event lasted more than four months, it is possible to conclude that 
the longer an outbreak continues, the greater change in volatility is caused. In the pork 
group, Sunjin and Farmstory Hannaeng’s standard deviations increased significantly after 
the event date in all test periods. Likewise for the poultry groups, all three companies 
experienced significant volatility increments in all test periods. As pointed out before, a 
HPAI outbreak occurred during this time period resulting in a significant negative impact. 
Therefore, this suggests that the HPAI outbreak is also a meaningful threat of stock prices 
and volatility to directly-related companies (i.e., poultry companies). In the imported 
meat group, Hanil Feed and Atinum Investment showed significant increment of 
volatility in all test periods. This is interesting because these companies had CAR 
reactions that changed from negative to positive. 
In the feed group, only one company, Woosung, significantly increased its 
variability of daily returns. Same as the second event in 2010, the vaccine companies 
experienced significant increases in volatility of daily returns. Particularly, nationwide 
vaccination was decided and applied in the third 2010 outbreak which generated more 
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abnormal reactions in longer periods of the event windows.
6
 This helps explain the cause 
of the volatility increase of this group. One more possible cause is a relative smaller size 
of the companies in the vaccine group. Salin and Hooker (2001) concluded that a small 
company in size was more influenced in the food recall incident, and this study also finds 
that smaller companies, in size of total asset and revenue, showed greater increment in 
their volatility.  
The modified F-statistic, which adjusted or normalized the change of the market 
index returns on individual stocks’ daily returns, concluded with the same results as the 
standard method. F-statistic values increased or decreased the values when compared to 
the standard method, but did not notably change the levels of significance. F-statistics of 











                                                 
6
 Vaccination in limited infected areas was decided on December 22
nd
, and nationwide vaccination was 
decided on January 13
th





CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATONS 
 
This study concludes that the foot-and-mouth (FMD) outbreaks caused the stock market 
to react in both a negative and positive manner to related firms. The first event in 2000 
had the most distinguishing and consenting results to prior expectations. The 2002 results 
showed relatively stable changes of returns. Additionally, this study concludes that the 
appropriate and prompt government responses lessened the stock market disturbance. In 
the 2010 events, some companies in several groups’ stock market reactions were 
unexpected as a result of other factors such as a market supply and demand conditions 
and another animal disease. This study succeeded in helping to explain some factors that 
caused this disagreement, but some were unidentifiable. The last 2010 event was the most 
severe FMD outbreak and generated many significant abnormal returns, but some of the 
stock market reactions were mixed.  
The stock market reactions were more gradual than instantaneous to the FMD 
outbreaks. That is to say, this study observed more meaningful values of cumulative 
abnormal returns than single-day abnormal returns. Furthermore, when an outbreak 
severely impacted a particular business sector, the accumulations of abnormal returns 
became substantial. The 2000 outbreak for the pork group is an explicit example. The 
long-lasting impacts of the FMD outbreak are understandable considering that negative 




The different groups did not maintain consistency in their reactions to the events. 
For example, the pork companies only realized a negative reaction in the 2000 and the 
third 2010 events. This study concludes that this group reacted negatively when the 
outbreak presented a negative outlook for the swine and pork businesses. The poultry and 
seafood firms reacted positively when there were no other substantial market threats. 
However, the groups’ reactions confused the results when other factors, such as an 
outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza, threatened the groups. The imported meat 
companies also showed mixed reactions. This study suspects that it was originated by the 
complicated structural characteristics; subsidiary companies are involved in imported 
meat business while these companies have main businesses in different sectors. The feed 
companies reacted negatively when the outbreaks substantially damaged the livestock 
production sites while the vaccine companies demonstrated clear and consistent reactions 
throughout the events.  
The FMD outbreaks increased volatility of daily returns. The change of the 
volatility was greater when an outbreak lasted for a longer period. For example, the last 
outbreak in 2010 increased volatility of daily returns for most of the sample companies as 
the outbreak continued more than four months. Both positive and negative reacting 
companies showed the increased volatility, indicating that the outbreaks increased 
riskiness of returns regardless of gaining or losing values of firms.  
 The conclusion of this study implies several significant points. For managers and 
shareholders, an FMD outbreak and possibly other animal diseases outbreaks require 
cautious monitoring and proper responses to protect the value of firms. Because of the 
increased volatility among all most firms, managers and shareholders of related firms 
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should pay careful attention to the change of their stock prices. Additionally, it is 
recommended to strengthen actions to improve public relations and sales of their products 
emphasizing the safety of livestock products consumption.         
An appropriate governmental intervention is crucial to mitigate damage of the 
FMD outbreak. In the 2002 outbreak, the Korean government’s actions and guidance 
were appropriate and prompt and mitigated the loss of the livestock production and 
market. This study found that the government responses also stabilized the stock market 
turmoil. Therefore, appropriate governmental programs should be established and applied 
when there is an animal health issue to help stabilize the livestock and its allied industry.  
For stock market participants, they should consider an animal disease outbreak 
cautiously. Investors, analysts, and other market participants are all interested in returns 
of stocks, and the abnormal returns caused by an unexpected market shock provide them 
of the opportunity for investment. However, this study concluded that the riskiness of 
returns also significantly increased with the presence of abnormal returns. Therefore, the 
stock market participants need to pay careful attention to an animal disease outbreak 
when they consider setting or modifying their portfolios and outlooks.  
 This study has several realized limitations. First, it tested five events and six 
different groups resulting in several samples with unclear and mixed results. Therefore, it 
is worthwhile that further research focuses these events more precisely in smaller scopes 
to create detail conclusions on the impacts of the FMD outbreaks. Second, the OLS 
market model can be inefficient when it does not satisfy the statistical assumptions. It will 
be intriguing if further research analyzed these events with other models such as 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and Generalized Autoregressive 
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Conditional Heteroskedasticity models. Finally, time-series comparison (i.e., comparison 
by the event) has not been performed in this study due to the inability of standardizing the 
magnitude of the outbreaks. Therefore, further research on impacts of an animal disease 


























Table 1. Dates and Durations and the Number of Animal Slaughtered in the Korean 
FMD Outbreaks 
Year / Case 2000 2002 2010-1 2010-2 2010-3 
Date of       
   Notification Mar 25 May 2 Jan 2 Apr 8 Nov 28 
   Confirmation Mar 27 May 3 Jan 4 Apr 9 Nov 29 





      
   No. of Calendar Days 19 51 25 28 126 
   No. of Trading Days 14 33 19 18 85 
   Confirmed Cases 15 16 6 11 153 
Animal Culled      
      Total 2,216 160,155 5,956 49,784 3,479,866 





















Source: Yahoo Korea Finance (http://kr.finance.yahoo.com/) & Daum Finance (http://stock.daum.net/). 
a
 Days from confirmation to termination. 
b 









Table 2. Number of Livestock and Farms in Korea by Species and Sales 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 
Number of livestock 
(thousand) 
      
    Beef cattle 2,594 1,590 1,819 2,430 2,635 2,922 
    Dairy cattle 553 544 479 446 445 430 
    Swine 6,461 8,214 8,962 9,087 9,585 9,881 
    Chicken
a
 85,800 102,547 109,628 119,784 138,768 149,200 
Number of farms (thousand)        
    Beef cattle 519 290 192 181 175 172 
    Dairy cattle 23 13 9 7 7 6 
    Swine 46 24 12 8 8 7 
    Chicken 203 218 136 3 4 4 
Number of livestock per farm       
    Beef cattle 5 6 9 13 15 17 
    Dairy cattle 24 41 54 64 66 68 
    Swine 141 345 729 1,183 1,204 1,345 
    Chicken 423 471 806 37,433 39,211 41,398 
       
Sales of production (bil won)       


































 33.5 35.3 39.9 40.9 
Proportion of GDP of   
Livestock industry (%) 
-
c
 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.3 -
c
 
Source: NACF Livestock Industry Statistics Book (May 2011). 
a
 From 2006, only farms with more than 3,000 heads were included in survey. 
b
 Values in parentheses are US billion Dollars. 
The USD values are converted with the 2010 average exchange rate of 1,155.48 won/dollar. 
c 






Table 3. Total Consumption and Per Capita Consumption of Livestock Products in 
Korea  
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 
Per Capita Consumption (kg) 
a
       
    Meat total 27.4 31.9 32.1 37.4 38.9 41.4 
        Beef 6.7 8.5 6.7 7.5 8.1 8.9 
        Pork 14.8 16.5 17.8 19.1 19.1 19.3 
        Chicken / Duck
b
 6.0 6.9 7.6 10.8 11.7 13.2 
    Egg 10.1 10.3 12.1 11.2 11.9 11.8 
    Milk 47.8 59.2 62.7 61.3 62.3 62.8 
    Fish -
d
 36.8 49.5 54.9 49.8 -
d
 
Total Consumption  
(thousand Metric Ton) 
      
    Meat total 1,231 1,510 1,512 1,728 1,780 1,794 
        Domestic 1,048 1,158 1,127 1,253 1,328 1,328 
        Self-sufficient rate (%) 
c
 85.1 76.7 74.5 72.5 74.6 74.0 
      Beef 301 402 317 365 396 434 
          Domestic 155 212 152 174 198 189 
          Self-sufficient rate (%)  51.4 52.8 48.1 47.6 50.0 43.5 
      Pork 662 780 839 928 916 944 
          Domestic 625 674 677 713 707 764 
          Self-sufficient rate (%)  94.5 86.4 80.7 76.9 77.2 81.0 
      Chicken 268 337 357 436 469 525 
          Domestic 262 262 298 366 399 426 
          Self-sufficient rate (%)  97.8 79.9 83.6 83.9 84.9 81.1 
    Egg 454 479 518 544 581 580 
        Domestic 454 479 515 542 579 578 
        Self-sufficient rate (%)  100 100 99.4 99.6 99.7 99.7 
    Milk 2,144 2,807 3,079 3,035 3,036 3,263 
        Domestic 1,998 2,253 2,229 2,139 2,077 2,073 
        Self-sufficient rate (%)  90.9 80.4 73.6 71.8 68.4 63.5 
Source: NACF Livestock Industry Statistics Book (May 2011). 
a
 1 kg = 2.21 pounds. 
b
 Duck meat is included beginning in 2008. 
c
 Self-sufficient rate is defined as a proportion of domestic-origin product to total consumption. 
d 
No Information is available.  
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Table 4. Information on Sample Companies  





Pork Farmsco (FC) Food 1999 
 Sunjin Holdings (SJ) Food 1979 
 Farmstory Hannaeng (FH) Food 1991 
Poultry Harim (HR) Food 1990 
 Maniker (MK) Food 1985 
 Dongwoo (DW) Food 1993 
Seafood Dongwon Industries (DI) Food 1969 
 Sajo Industries (SI) Food 1971 
 Oyang (OY) Food 1969 
Imported  Dongaone (DA) Food 1972 
Meat Hanil Feed (HF) Food 1968 
 Atinum Investment (AI) Investment 1988 
Feed Woosung Feed (WS) Food 1970 
 Korea Industry (KI) Food 1957 
 KC Feed (KC) Food 1970 
Vaccine Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory (CV) Pharmacy 1994 
 Eagle Veterinary Technology (EV) Pharmacy 1983 
 Cheil Bio (CB) Pharmacy 1977 
a




Table 5. Total Assets, Gross Revenues, and Operational Characteristics of the 
Sample Companies. All Values Are Based on Operations in 2010 




Pork Farmsco (FC) Food 1999 
 Sunjin Holdings (SJ) Food 1979 
 Farmstory Hannaeng (FH) Food 1991 
Poultry Harim (HR) Food 1990 
 Maniker (MK) Food 1985 
 Dongwoo (DW) Food 1993 
Seafood Dongwon Industries (DI) Food 1969 
 Sajo Industries (SI) Food 1971 
 Oyang (OY) Food 1969 
Imported  Dongaone (DA) Food 1972 
Meat Hanil Feed (HF) Food 1968 
 Atinum Investment (AI) Investment 1988 
Feed Woosung Feed (WS) Food 1970 
 Korea Industry (KI) Food 1957 
 KC Feed (KC) Food 1970 
Vaccine Choong Ang Vaccine Laboratory (CV) Pharmacy 1994 
 Eagle Veterinary Technology (EV) Pharmacy 1983 
 Cheil Bio (CB) Pharmacy 1977 
 
Source: Yahoo Korea Finance (http://kr.finance.yahoo.com/) & Daum Finance (http://stock.daum.net/). 
a, b
 Values in parentheses are million US Dollars.  





Table 6. Summary Statistics on Daily Returns in the 2000 Estimation Period, 300 
Days Before the Test Period 
Group 
 











Maximum (%) - 15.00 - 12.00  - 
Minimum (%) - -10.78 - -12.00 - - 
Average (%) - 0.05 - 0.45 - - 
Standard        
Deviation (%) 
- 4.17 - 6.06 - - 
Sample Number 
b
 - 300 - 300 - - 
       
Group  Seafood   Feed  
Company DI SI OY WS KI KC 
Maximum (%) 14.95 14.98 15.00 14.83 15.00 12.00 
Minimum (%) -11.83 -15.00 -14.91 -14.58 -15.00 -11.99 
Average (%) -0.03 0.07 0.16 -0.02 0.19 0.67 
Standard        
Deviation (%) 
4.25 4.97 5.37 4.36 7.47 6.73 
Sample Number
 b
 300 300 300 300 300 300 
a
 Companies did not exist or was not publically traded during estimation period.
  
b







Table 7. Summary Statistics on Daily Returns in the 2002 Estimation Period, 250 
Days Before the Test Period 
Group 
 
Pork   Poultry 
 
Company FC SJ FH HR MK DW 
a
 
Maximum (%) 14.92 14.43 11.96 11.88 11.94 - 
Minimum (%) -14.97 -14.69 -11.65 -11.54 -11.98 - 
Average (%) 0.15 0.30 0.03 0.06 0.00 - 
Standard Deviation (%) 4.23 2.56 3.22 3.81 3.73 - 
Sample Number
 b
 250 250 250 250 250 - 
       
Group  Seafood   Feed  
Company DI SI OY WS KI KC 
Maximum (%) 12.32 14.90 15.00 14.62 15.00 11.96 
Minimum (%) -14.67 -14.99 -14.93 -14.94 -14.97 -11.82 
Average (%) 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.00 
Standard Deviation (%) 3.49 3.97 4.37 2.57 4.67 3.41 
Sample Number
 b
 250 250 250 250 250 250 
a
 Company was not publically traded during estimation period.
  
b





Table 8. Summary Statistics on Daily Returns in the 2010 Estimation Period, 300 
Days Before the Test Period 
Group  Pork   Poultry   Seafood  
Company FC SJ FH HR MK DW DI SI OY 
Maximum (%) 15.00 11.03 14.39 14.97 14.72 15.00 15.00 14.95 15.00 
Minimum (%) -14.98 -15.00 -13.95 -14.73 -12.87 -14.96 -13.46 -10.87 -15.00 
Average (%) 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.39 0.20 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.38 
Standard 
Deviation (%) 





300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
          
Group  Imported Meat   Feed   Vaccine  
Company DA HF AI WS KI KC CV EV CB 
Maximum (%) 14.72 14.95 14.88 14.95 14.89 13.89 15.00 14.99 15.00 
Minimum (%) -8.16 -14.97 -14.58 -14.98 -14.96 -14.88 -14.98 -15.00 -15.00 
Average (%) 0.01 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.05 0.41 0.21 0.28 
Standard 
Deviation (%) 





300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
a







Table 9. Normal Return Regression Result of the 2000 Event  

















Constant - -0.0257 - 0.3381 - - 
Model F-
statistics 
- 27.56** - 6.13* - - 
R
2
 - 0.0846 - 0.0202 - - 













- 1.67 - 0.13 - - 
       
Group  Seafood   Feed  















Constant -0.1390 -0.0320 0.0848 -0.1399 0.1092 0.6049 
Model F-
statistics 
59.08** 25.31** 15.87** 71.39** 10.11** 7.48** 
R
2
 0.1655 0.1031 0.0566 0.1933 0.0328 0.0245 




















2.69 15.26** 7.27* 3.28 3.09 0.87 
 
*   Statistically significant at 5% significance level.    
**  Statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
a
 Significant points of dL and dU at 5% significance level of (2, 200) = (1.748, 1.789) 
 Values in parentheses are Durban-Watson d-statistics after correcting for AR(1). In those columns with  
autocorrelation, corrected results are presented.  
b
 White Test χ2-statistics with * & ** indicate that the original regression results were detected to contain  
heteroskedasticity at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In those columns with 
heteroskedasticity, corrected results are presented using White’s method.  
c






Table 10. Normal Return Regression Result of the 2002 Event  
Group  Pork   Poultry  
















Constant -0.0619 0.1635 -0.0678 -0.0703 -0.0870 - 
Model F-
statistics 
53.61** 24.37** 26.61** 22.95** 16.97** - 
R
2
 0.1778 0.1976 0.0969 0.0847 0.0640 - 




2.4808 1.9844 2.3843 2.1947 2.2580 - 




0.57 9.65** 2.84 3.95 2.94 - 
       
Group  Seafood   Feed  















Constant 0.0516 -0.0286 -0.1227 0.1283 -0.1058 -0.1686 
Model F-
statistics 
26.12** 29.74** 31.80** 12.79** 14.80** 56.82** 
R
2
 0.1577 0.1071 0.1136 0.1361 0.0563 0.1864 




1.8994 2.6234 2.3687 2.5120 1.8525 2.2902 




7.57* 2.15 3.59 13.69** 2.03 0.17 
 
*   Statistically significant at 5% significance level.    
**  Statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
a
 Significant points of dL and dU at 5% significance level of (2, 200) = (1.748, 1.789). 
b
 White Test χ2-statistics with * & ** indicate that the original regression results were detected to contain  
heteroskedasticity at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In those columns with 
heteroskedasticity, corrected results are presented using White’s Method. 
c




Table 11. Normal Return Regression Result of the 2010 Event  
Group  Pork   Poultry  















Constant 0.2106 0.1622 0.1130 0.2929 0.1308 0.1755 
Model F-
statistics 
21.06** 36.93** 207.92** 76.24** 52.50** 73.77** 
R
2
 0.0660 0.2123 0.4410 0.2037 0.1498 0.1984 




















2.32 7.25* 0.46 5.15 3.70 2.40 
       
Group  Seafood   Imported Meat  















Constant 0.0909 0.1768 0.2560 -0.0195 0.1154 0.0451 
Model F-
statistics 
99.42** 17.29** 61.69** 10.37** 92.70** 103.32** 
R
2
 0.2502 0.1219 0.1715 0.0336 0.2373 0.2575 




1.9165 2.0006 1.9328 2.0045 2.0526 2.7042 




2.52 12.54** 0.06 0.95 0.90 5.18 
*   Statistically significant at 5% significance level.    
**  Statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
a
 Significant points of dL and dU at 5% significance level of (2, 200) = (1.748, 1.789) 
 Values in parentheses are Durban-Watson d-statistics after correcting for AR(1). In those columns with  
autocorrelation, corrected results are presented.  
b 
White Test χ2-statistics with * & ** indicate that the original regression results were detected to contain  
heteroskedasticity at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In those columns with 





Table 11. Normal Return Regression Result of the 2010 Event, Continued 
Group  Feed   Vaccine  















Constant 0.0780 0.1134 0.0935 0.2664 0.0845 0.1698 
Model F-
statistics 
27.72** 77.93** 14.95** 51.58** 66.57** 40.76** 
R
2
 0.0766 0.2073 0.0568 0.1476 0.1826 0.1203 




2.3248 2.2033 1.8566 1.8688 2.0541 2.0070 




4.07 4.53 0.11 0.81 0.26 1.02 
*   Statistically significant at 0.05 significance level.    
** Statistically significant at 0.01 significance level.  
a
 Significant points of dL and dU at 0.05 significance level of (2, 200) = (1.748, 1.789) 
Values in parentheses are Durban-Watson d-statistics after correcting for AR(1). In those columns with  
autocorrelation, corrected results are presented.  
b
 White Test χ2-statistics with * & ** indicate that the original regression results were detected to contain  
heteroskedasticity at 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. In those columns with 









Table 12. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the 2000 Event 
Group  Pork   Poultry   Seafood   Feed  
Company SJ HR DI SI OY WS KC KI 
Abnormal 





































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
 
67 
Table 13. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the 2002 Event 
Group  Pork   Poultry   Seafood   Feed  

































































































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.65, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 14. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the First 2010 Event (January) 
Group  Pork   Poultry   Seafood  





































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 14. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the First 2010 Event (January), Continued 
Group  Imported Meat   Feed   Vaccine  





































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 15. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Second 2010 Event (April) 
Group  Pork   Poultry   Seafood  





































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 15. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Second 2010 Event (April), Continued 
Group  Imported Meat   Feed   Vaccine  





































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 16. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Third 2010 Event (November) 
Group  Pork   Poultry   Seafood  





































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 16. Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Third 2010 Event (November), Continued 
Group  Imported Meat   Feed   Vaccine  





































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are t-statistics. 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level. (AR >2.59, CAR 5-day >4.60, 10-day >3.24, 20-day >2.86, 30-day >2.75, all in absolute value). 
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level. (AR >1.96, CAR 5-day >2.77, 10-day >2.25, 20-day >2.09, 30-day >2.04, all in absolute value). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level. (AR >1.64, CAR 5-day >2.13, 10-day >1.83, 20-day >1.72, 30-day >1.69, all in absolute value).  
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Table 17. Volatility Change of Stock Prices Before and After the FMD Outbreaks Using Standard Deviation 
Group   Pork     Poultry  
Company SJ FC FH HR MK DW 
2000 -150 4.45  -  -  6.24  -  -  
 -100 4.99  -  -  7.18  -  -  
 -50 5.40  -  -  7.18  -  -  
 50 5.79  (1.15,0.59) -  -  7.54  (1.10,0.56) -  -  
 100 5.01  (1.01,0.67) -  -  6.43  (0.80,0.53) -  -  
 150 5.59*** (1.58,0.95) -  -  5.92  (0.90,0.54) -  -  
2002 -150 2.68  4.39  3.06  3.89  3.28  -  
 -100 3.12  5.00  3.07  3.82  2.59  -  
 -50 3.33  5.42  3.65  4.85  3.05  -  
 50 3.15  (0.90,0.53) 2.88  (0.28,0.17) 2.52  (0.48,0.28) 4.70  (0.94,0.56) 4.09** (1.80,1.07) -  
 100 4.68***  (2.25,2.22) 3.08  (0.38,0.37) 2.72  (0.79,0.78) 3.76  (0.97,0.96) 3.35*** (1.68,1.65) -  
 150 4.01*** (2.24,2.02) 3.59  (0.67,0.61) 2.35  (0.59,0.53) 3.45  (0.79,0.71) 7.98*** (5.92,5.35) -  
2010-1 -50 1.41  5.03  2.20  2.54  1.60  1.90  
 50 1.71* (1.48,1.54) 3.42  (0.46,0.48) 1.08  (0.24,0.25) 1.96  (0.60,0.62) 3.64*** (5.15,5.35) 2.73*** (2.07,2.15) 
2010-2 -50 1.45  3.06  1.25  2.05  3.33  2.33  
 50 1.71  (1.39,1.07) 5.45*** (3.18,2.45) 2.09*** (2.78,2.15) 3.36*** (2.69,2.08) 4.69*** (1.99,1.53) 2.71  (1.35,1.04) 
2010-3 -150 2.50  3.40  1.42  2.66  3.16  2.00  
 -100 2.99  3.48  1.01  2.28  1.95  1.56  
 -50 3.50  2.93  0.68  2.38  2.00  1.66  
 50 4.98*** (2.02,2.36) 2.39  (0.66,0.77) 4.09*** (36.28,42.33) 3.12**  (1.72,2.00) 3.14*** (2.47,2.88) 2.09*  (1.58,1.84) 
 100 4.61*** (2.37,1.87) 3.19  (0.84,0.66) 5.21*** (26.59,21.00) 3.63*** (2.53,2.00) 3.66*** (3.52,2.78) 2.87*** (3.38,2.67) 
 150 4.29*** (2.95,2.55) 3.10  (0.83,0.72) 4.82*** (11.55,9.99) 3.25*** (1.49,1.29) 3.67**  (1.35,1.17) 2.78*** (1.94,1.68) 
Values in parentheses are F-statistics (
2 2
, , =  / i after i beforeF   ,
2 2 2 2
, , , , = (  / ) / (  / )i after i before index after index beforeF     . 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level (50-day >1.95, 100-day >1.59, 150-day >1.45).  
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level (50-day >1.59, 100-day >1.38, 150-day >1.29).  
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level (50-day >1.43, 100-day >1.28, 150-day >1.22). 
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Table 17. Volatility Change of Stock Prices Before and After the FMD Outbreaks Using Standard Deviation, Continued 
Group  Seafood   Imported Meat   
Company DI  SI  OY  HF  DA  AI  
2000 -150 4.47  4.48  5.14  -  -  -  
 -100 4.74  4.92  5.82  -  -  -  
 -50 5.01  5.40  6.31  -  -  -  
 50 4.87  (0.95,0.48) 5.78  (1.15,0.59) 5.92  (0.88,0.45) -  -  -  
 100 4.67  (0.97,0.64) 4.75  (0.93,0.62) 5.31  (0.83,0.55) -  -  -  
 150 4.51  (1.01,0.61) 5.08* (1.28,0.77) 5.48  (1.14,0.69) -  -  -  
2002 -150 2.53  3.32  3.37  -  -  -  
 -100 2.33  3.16  3.07  -  -  -  
 -50 2.41  3.57  3.12  -  -  -  
 50 2.22  (0.85,0.50) 3.58  (1.00,0.60) 3.84* (1.51,0.90) -  -  -  
 100 2.81**  (1.46,1.44) 3.00  (0.90,0.89) 3.34  (1.18,1.17) -  -  -  
 150 3.29*** (1.69,1.53) 3.30  (0.99,0.89) 3.70  (1.21,1.09) -  -  -  
2010-1 -50 1.85  2.34  2.89  3.36  1.75  3.85  
 50 1.74  (0.89,0.92) 1.85  (0.63,0.65) 2.06  (0.51,0.53) 3.48  (1.07,1.11) 0.80  (0.21,0.22) 2.47  (0.41,0.43) 
2010-2 -50 1.42  1.68  1.66  1.95  2.39  3.98  
 50 1.43  (1.01,0.78) 3.40*** (4.11,3.17) 2.31** (1.92,1.48) 2.39*  (1.50,1.16) 2.37  (0.99,0.76) 3.84  (0.93,0.72) 
2010-3 -150 1.50  2.70  1.77  2.17  3.01  3.14  
 -100 1.54  2.25  1.66  2.06  3.39  2.65  
 -50 1.67  2.59  1.74  2.10  4.57  1.64  
 50 1.56  (0.87,1.02) 3.22*  (1.54,1.80) 3.16*** (3.32,3.87) 6.39*** (9.28,10.83) 2.29  (0.25,0.29) 6.06*** (13.56,15.82) 
 100 1.67  (1.17,0.92) 2.90*** (1.67,1.32) 3.42*** (4.26,3.36) 6.15*** (8.90,7.03) 2.58  (0.58,0.46) 5.27*** (3.96,3.13) 
 150 1.75** (1.36,1.18) 2.70  (1.00,0.87) 3.10*** (3.07,2.66) 5.42*** (6.23,5.39) 2.70  (0.80,0.70) 4.57*** (2.13,1.84) 
Values in parentheses are F-statistics (
2 2
, , =  / i after i beforeF   ,
2 2 2 2
, , , , = (  / ) / (  / )i after i before index after index beforeF     . 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level (50-day >1.95, 100-day >1.59, 150-day >1.45).  
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level (50-day >1.59, 100-day >1.38, 150-day >1.29). 
*    Statistically significant at 10% significance level (50-day >1.43, 100-day >1.28, 150-day >1.22). 
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Table 17. Volatility Change of Stock Prices Before and After the FMD Outbreaks Using Standard Deviation, Continued  
Group  Feed   Vaccine  
Company WS  KC  KI  EV  CV  CB  
2000 -150 4.54  6.82  8.00  -  -  -  
 -100 4.96  7.26  8.37  -  -  -  
 -50 5.45  8.13  7.76  -  -  -  
 50 6.35  (1.36,0.69) 9.26  (1.30,0.66) 6.71  (0.75,0.38) -  -  -  
 100 5.13  (1.07,0.71) 8.00  (1.21,0.80) 6.86  (0.67,0.45) -  -  -  
 150 4.74  (1.09,0.66) 7.27  (1.13,0.68) 7.61  (0.90,0.55) -  -  -  
2002 -150 2.64  3.03  3.84  -  -  -  
 -100 2.36  2.38  3.58  -  -  -  
 -50 2.81  2.91  4.39  -  -  -  
 50 1.52  (0.29,0.17) 2.80  (0.92,0.55) 8.67*** (3.89,2.31) -  -  -  
 100 1.72  (0.53,0.52) 2.38  (1.00,0.99) 6.94*** (3.77,3.72) -  -  -  
 150 2.08  (0.62,0.56) 2.30  (0.58,0.52) 6.37*** (2.76,2.49) -  -  -  
2010-1 -50 2.51  1.32  2.45  3.47  6.49  3.87  
 50 2.57  (1.05,1.09) 1.99*** (2.28,2.37) 2.95* (1.45,1.50) 1.81  (0.27,0.28) 3.99  (0.38,0.39) 2.48  (0.41,0.43) 
2010-2 -50 3.06  4.24  4.08  0.87  2.10  1.93  
 50 3.69*  (1.45,1.12) 8.75*** (4.26,3.29) 3.25  (0.63,0.49) 5.65*** (41.99,32.38) 6.58*** (9.81,7.56) 5.38*** (7.76,5.98) 
2010-3 -150 1.90  5.72  2.00  2.52  3.61  2.44  
 -100 1.17  4.23  1.63  1.68  2.94  1.49  
 -50 1.06  3.04  1.90  1.12  2.28  1.36  
 50 2.79*** (6.87,8.02) 1.78  (0.34,0.40) 1.56  (0.68,0.79) 3.40*** (9.13,10.65) 4.28*** (3.54,4.13) 4.32*** (10.04,11.72) 
 100 2.56*** (4.77,3.77) 2.88  (0.46,0.37) 1.45  (0.79,0.62) 2.63*** (2.46,1.94) 3.41  (1.35,1.06) 3.36*** (5.07,4.00) 
 150 2.78*** (2.15,1.86) 3.16  (0.30,0.26) 1.69 (0.71,0.61) 3.57*** (2.01,1.74) 3.02  (0.70,0.60) 3.05*** (1.56,1.35) 
Values in parentheses are F-statistics (
2 2
, , =  / i after i beforeF   ,
2 2 2 2
, , , , = (  / ) / (  / )i after i before index after index beforeF     . 
***  Statistically significant at 1% significance level (50-day >1.95, 100-day >1.59, 150-day >1.45).  
**   Statistically significant at 5% significance level (50-day >1.59, 100-day >1.38, 150-day >1.29). 
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